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The conjoint quest for a liberal positive program:  
“Old Chicago”, Freiburg and Hayek 
 





James M. Buchanan’s latest contribution to the post-crisis debate in political economy underpins the 
necessity to reexamine the legacy of the “Old Chicago” School of thought, being urged by Buchanan’s 
recently stressed plea at the 2009 Regional Meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society and at the Summer 
Institute for the Preservation of the History of Economic Thought in 2010. 
 
The focus of the current paper is to follow his plea by exploring the central topoi of the 1930’s debate of 
the Chicago School as seen from the work of Henry Simons and discuss its impact on the academic arena 
on both sides of the Atlantic thereafter. With respect to this impact, we highlight Friedrich A. von Hayek 
as the focal scholar who possibly transmits these topoi that later influenced the rise of Freiburgean ordo-
liberalism in Germany from the mid-1930’s onwards as youngest archival findings suggest. By revisiting 
the MPS 1947 first meeting’s minutes and papers, we stress the proximity in mind of “Old Chicago”, 
Hayek  and  the  Freiburg  School  ordo-liberals  by  contributing  an  explanation  for  the  surprisingly 
homogenous direction of these yet unconnected schools of thought. 
 
In a next, enhanced version of this project, we will subsequently re-discuss the intellectual origins of 
Constitutional Political Economy’s research program. Following Viktor Vanberg, we argue that CPE can 
be  interpreted  as  a  modernized  perspective  on  economics  that  carries  forward  three  strands  of 
transatlantic liberal programs, being precisely “Old Chicago”, Freiburg and Hayek. 
                                                       
1 Dipl.-Volkswirt Ekkehard Köhler, Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, koehler@eucken.de 
2 Dipl.-Volkswirt Stefan Kolev, HWWI/Wilhelm-Röpke-Institut, Erfurt, Germany, kolev@hwwi.org  
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1.  Introduction 
The latest financial and economic crisis has undoubtedly reawakened public and academic interest for the 
scholarly discourse in economics of the 1930s. Large think tanks foster a re-enactment of John Maynard 
Keynes or Friedrich August von Hayek with various methods and intentions, while scholars address their 
audience to re-discuss economic ideas of the Great Depression and its subsequent period with special 
respect to the historicity of the then learned lessons. One of these scholars is James M. Buchanan who has 
highlighted  the  importance  of  the  “Old  Chicago”  School  (and  sharply  contrasted  it  from  the  “New 
Chicago”  School’s  tenets,  see  Buchanan  (2010)),  another  is  Viktor  Vanberg  who  has  highlighted  the 
importance of the Freiburg School of Economics. The Chicago School and the Freiburg School both 
emerge during this period and have remarkably influenced the design of the post-war economic orders as 
well as the scholarly discourse in economics in the United States and Germany, respectively. 
 
This paper explores the naissance of these schools of thought by a comparison of their academic agendas 
in economic policy and argues that they were mainly set by their founders Henry Simons and Walter 
Eucken, respectively. Exploring the literature of their time as well as archival material, we have found 
good reasons to assume that Friedrich August von Hayek can be identified as a bridging element between 
the “Old Chicago” and the Freiburg School, whose research agendas are of a remarkably proximate nature 
by the end of the 1940s. In our opinion, the hypothesis of a Simons-Eucken-Hayek triangle of academic 
interaction can be justified since their scientific work of the 1930s and 1940s reflects a parallel search for a 
positive liberal program. Their programs share a surprisingly large degree of similarities, not only with 
respect  to  the  proposed  institutions  and  policy  recommendation  but  moreover  with  respect  to  their 
conjoint revealed preference for rules over discretion. In addition, the programs are long-run oriented 
framework proposals that counter the status-quo of economics of this time which were significantly short-
run oriented (Friedman (1948), p. 133). This long-run and rule-oriented liberal approach is focused on the 
importance of “rules of the game” to be set by government and the “moves of the game” to be left to the 
private individuals. In the unanimous opinion of the three authors, this is not interventionism but the rule 
of  law  which  is  enforced  by  the  state  that  stresses  the  constitutional  prerequisites  for  the  proper 
functioning of a market economy. They do not assign to government the task to intervene und correct 
results, but to set up the fundamentals of the economic order. In a way, the three liberals focus their 
search on the “visualization” of Adam Smith’s invisible hand by stressing the importance of proper rules 
for economic policy. 
 
To discuss this hypothesis, we explore the role of Simons in the intellectual naissance of the Chicago 
School first. This section is divided between an abstract (fundamental principles) level and a second plain 
which focuses on his practical economic policy. In a next step, the striking similarities between Simons, 
Eucken and Hayek in the 1930s and 1940s are depicted. This section briefly discusses publication of the 
three authors from these two decades as well as three papers which Eucken, Hayek and Aaron Director 
(as a disciple of Simons) deliver at the founding meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. Finally, a  
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conclusion  summarizes  this  comparative  study  and  attempts  an  outlook  as  to  its  relationship  to 
Constitutional Political Economy and the relevance of a rule-based economic policy in today’s post-crisis 
period. 
 
2.  Henry Simons and the “Old Chicago” School 
Frank Knight (1885-1972) and Jacob Viner (1892-1970) are often considered as the main founders of the 
Chicago School’s perspective on economics (Reder (1987), p. 414).3 Both plea for “less abstraction and 
more realism in economics so that the discipline can serve as a better guide for policy”, as Razeen Sally 
characterizes their conjoint aim towards a problem-oriented perspective on economics (Sally (1998), p. 
71). Henry Simons’ (1899-1946) 4 contributions to the emergence of the “Old Chicago” School, especially 
with regard to its applied and policy-problem-oriented perspective, have been widely neglected in the 
modern discussion. Although a doctoral student of Frank Knight, it is remarkable that James Buchanan 
appraises precisely Simons as “the most articulate expositor of the “old” Chicago School” (Buchanan 
(2010), p. 3). 
 
By the end-1940s, however, Simons’ unique role was still appraised and appreciated:  “Through his writing 
and more especially through his teaching at the University of Chicago, he was slowly establishing himself 
as  the  head  of  a  school”,  as  Aaron  Director  puts  it  already  in  1947  while  introducing  the  volume 
“Economic Policy for a Free Society” (Director (1947/48)) which includes Simons’ major writings of his 
later career in Chicago. 
 
One of the reasons why Henry Simons’ contributions have been somewhat neglected in the meantime can 
be explained by the reception of the “New Chicago” School whose leading figures Milton Friedman and 
George Stigler have an ambiguous intellectual relationship to Simons. A highly interesting discussion 
among the “New Chicagoans” in the early 1980s crystallizes to the remarkable opinion that Henry Simons 
and his ideas must be seen from their “New Chicago” perspective as “interventionist” (De Long (1990), 
pp.  601-604).5  In  this  context,  it  is  thus  not  a  surprise  why  the  1987  edition  of  The  New  Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics offers a harsh critique on Simon’s contributions to the Chicago School: 
“Simons’ view had a distinctly populist flavour that is absent from those more recently associated 
with Chicago economics. For example, he favoured use of government power to reduce the size 
                                                       
3 For a more detailed account on Chicago’s varieties of ideas and methods, see Bronfenbrenner (1962). 
4 Henry C. Simons is born in Virden, Illinois in 1899. He graduates from the University of Michigan in 1920, and 
begins teaching immediately after graduation at the University of Iowa. In 1927 he moves to the University of 
Chicago, where he remains for the rest of his life. He dies at the early age of 47 in 1946. Simons writes relatively little 
in his active years – two books and less than a dozen articles – and his influence made itself felt more as a teacher 
than as a writer. He was surrounded by an unusually brilliant set of colleagues – Jacob Viner (1882-1970), Frank 
Knight (1885-1972), Henry Schultz (1893-1938), Paul Douglas (1892-1976) and many more – among whom he held 
his  own  position,  supplying  some  of  the  essential  philosophical  ingredients  of  the  unique  Chicago  outlook  on 
economic affairs (Blaug (1992), p. xi). 
5 For the original statements of Ronald Coase, Milton Friedman and George Stigler, see Kitch (1983), pp. 178-179.  
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of  large  firms  and  labour  unions.  Where  such  policies  would  lead  to  unacceptable  losses  of 
efficiency, Simons favoured outright public ownership. In sharp contrast to more recent Chicago 
statements on the matter, Simons emphatically supported progressive income taxation to promote 
a more egalitarian distribution of income”. (Reder (1987), p. 414) 
 
Despite this partial dispossession of Simons from his contribution to the Chicagoan legacy, which can be 
undoubtedly  attributed  to  the  methodological  and  political  divergences  of  the  “New”  and  the  “Old 
Chicago” School, we are of the opinion that his contributions need to be analysed in its historicity, i.e. as 
they were articulated in the times of the United States largest and most intense economic crisis.  
 
2.1  The theoretical approach of Simons and the role of government 
This section has the goal to describe Simons’ theoretical approach, i.e. the underlying principles that lead 
him to formulate the positive agenda towards a rule-based framework that constitutes the economic 
system. For delineating these principles, a reconstruction of the “cascade” of arguments (forming the 
central topos of Simons’ reasoning) is necessary: This is what is attempted in the following section. 
 
To begin with, Simons is a pronounced adherent of democracy as the ideal form of government. This is 
quite important for the role which he eventually attributes to government since he permanently elaborates 
on the issue whether specifically a democracy can cope with the various potential tasks which one might 
assign to government in an abstract sense. Early in the essay on his own political predispositions, he 
describes democracy as “government by discussion” and depicts consensus as the key prerequisite for the 
orderly  functioning  of  the  democratic  process  (Simons  (1945/48),  pp.  7-11).  The  question  arises,  of 
course, as to which the potential issues are one can conjointly agree upon in a democracy and which issues 
will probably remain controversial. 
 
From  this  seminal  question,  Simons  draws  two  important  conclusions.  First,  the  likelihood  to  attain 
consensus is the higher, the lower the level of the federal structure is, i.e. he ardently pleads for strong 
federalism where (in the sense of subsidiarity) all issues which are manageable at the lowest level of the 
federation are to be tackled there (Simons (1945/48), pp. 12-14). Secondly, and more importantly in the 
following analysis, he envisions “a genuine “division of labor” between competitive and political controls” 
(Simons (1934/48), pp. 41-42, also Simons (1936/48), p. 160), even stresses that precisely “Laissez faire, 
to repeat, implies a division of tasks between competitive and political controls” (Simons (1934/48), p. 
55).  Already  from  this  quote  one  can  infer  the  positive  role  which  Simons  attributes  to  government: 
Government is obviously not only not an evil (to be rolled back by negative policies) but an absolutely 
necessary complement to a system of free markets. 
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What precisely is to be done by this democratic, “positive program” government? Following quote best 
summarizes the Simons’ notion of the ideally functioning government in his theory of order: 
“The proper function of the state [...] is largely not that of providing services but that of providing 
the framework within which business, local-public and private, may effectively be conducted.” 
(Simons (1945/48), p. 18) 
This does not mean that there is no service function of the state, as the term “largely” already indicates: 
Government can provide services, in the best case at the lowest level of its federal structure and strictly 
sticking to the rule of law. But this is not the core of Simons’ theory: Instead, his notion is centered 
around the framework concept which government has to provide as an essential prerequisite for the market 
economy. 
 
Before detailing on his framework concept, it is important to formulate the criterion according to which 
this framework-based government is to be optimally organised: It is the presence of power in the economy 
and the goal to destroy any power concentration which - if not tackled by a consequent decentralization - 
can become a lethal threat to the market relationships. Decentralization as the chief instrument to achieve 
this  is  to  be  used  in  a  political  sense  (i.e.  by  strengthening  federalism)  and  especially  in  a  sense  of 
disempowering the economy. Another goal to be tackled by government is the fight against inequality, which 
is primarily to be addressed by taxation. For the time being, let us remain with the issues of power and the 
concept of the disempowering framework. 
 
“But the ultimate liberty obviously is that of men equal in power”: This quotation (Simons (1945/48), p. 
7) depicts the main characteristic of a free society in Simons’ view. The key solution to this problem can 
be provided by the framework which government has to deliver. What is the structure of this framework? 
The seminal concept of rules comes into play here, they are the constituent elements of the framework and 
are the vehicle of disempowerment: 
“Only by adherence to the rule of law and to announced rules of policy may a people have strong 
government without granting inordinate, arbitrary power to ruling parties, factions, or majorities 
of the moment.” (Simons (1945/48), p. 19) 
as well as: 
“A  democratic,  free-enterprise  system  implies,  and  requires  for  its  effective  functioning  and 
survival, a stable framework of definite rules, laid down in legislation and subject to change only 
gradually and with careful regard for the vested interests of participants in the economic game.” 
(Simons (1936/48), p. 181) 
As becomes clear from these statements, the rule of law is only one part of the solution, in addition “rules 
of policy” as necessary to complement the rule of law in the economic sphere. In this context he often 
talks of “”constitutional”” rules of policy” (Simons (1944/48a), p. 109), “the “constitutional structure””  
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(Simons 1936/48), p. 170) or “a constitutional provision” (Simons (1936/48), p. 176). Thus, the way he 
reflects on the framework concept is one of emulating the traditional constitutional approach in the legal 
sense while extending it to the economic system. 
 
What is underlying this stance is a vision of the economy as a game, a game which necessarily requires rules 
in order to function in a proper (i.e. disempowering and inequality-combating) manner. The instrument of 
rules seems essential for the viability of a democratic government: 
“There is no means for protecting the common interest save in terms of rules of policy; and it is 
only  in  terms  of  general  rules  or  principles  that  democracy,  which  is  government  by  free, 
intelligent discussion, can function tolerably or endure.” (Simons (1944/48b), p. 123) 
as well as: 
“The importance of rules, and of focusing democratic discussion on general principles of policy, 
calls for emphasis at many points in criticism of [Alvin, EK/SK] Hansen’s proposals. Only with 
rules of policy can common national interest be protected against minorities (as lobbies or as 
monopolies);  only  with  issues  of  general  principle  can  government  by  intelligent  discussion 
prevail. [...]; only by adherence to wise rules of action can we escape a political opportunism which 
jeopardizes and destroys what we wish most to protect and to preserve.” (Simons (1942/48), p. 
202) 
 
What these rules in particular policy areas are will be explained in the next section describing competition 
policy and the monetary reform measures. For the current section - being focused on Simons’ theoretical 
foundations - it is seminal to stress the general characteristics of the framework-constituting rules: It is 
these specific characteristics which enable democracy to find a consensus on rules, thus saving it from the 
constant  quarrel  on  individual,  discretionary  decisions.  Simons  talks  at  several  occasions  about  the 
necessary qualities of his ideal type of rules: “more definite and adequate “rules of the game”” (Simons 
(1934/48), p. 57), “simple rule or principle”, “rules of the game as to money are definite, intelligible, and 
inflexible” (ibid, p. 63) or “definite, mechanical set of rules of the economic game” (Simons (1936/48), 
p.173). Thus, the rules are to be clear interpersonally (minimizing the need for bureaucratic interpretation 
and discretion) and intertemporally (stabilizing the expectations of the private actors). Having this in 
mind, Simons focuses on the economic order in the sense of the order of rules. 
 
The positive properties of his framework concept also mean that the opposite type of policy is not to be 
pursued. This would be an economic policy which interferes not with the “rules of the game” but with the 
individual prices and their relations. Simons calls this illegitimate interference an intervention in “the heart 
of the contract”:  
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“The  policy,  therefore,  should  be  defined  positively,  as  one  under  which  the  state  seeks  to 
establish and maintain such conditions [by a legal and institutional framework, EK/SK] that it 
may avoid the necessity of regulating “the heart of the contract” - that is to say, the necessity of 
regulating relative prices.” (Simons (1934/48), p. 42) 
The criterion as to whether a measure is to be included into his rule-based positive program is thus the 
question whether it interferes with or, in other words, manipulates the structure of the relative prices (and 
relative wages). 
 
Before  turning  to  the  concrete  rules  of  competition  and  monetary  reform,  two  final  comments  are 
necessary to better understand the role which Simons attributes to government in his theory of order. 
 
First, he often underscores the interrelationships between the different societal orders, i.e. between the legal, 
political and economic order. As already mentioned above, the constitutional principle of the legal order is 
to be extended to the economic order for the reason of disempowerment and for the intertemporal 
stability  of  economic  rules.  In  addition,  he  perpetually  shows  the  intimate  relationship  between  the 
economic and the political order, in other words that economic policy decisions (e.g. the admissibility of 
deflation) can severely impair the functioning of a democratic political order: 
“Such  measures  [adoption  of  rules,  EK/SK],  at  all  events,  seem  essential  in  a  program  for 
avoiding revolutionary changes in economic and political institutions.” (Simons (1936/48), p. 173) 
as well as: 
“The  best  monetary  system,  so  to  speak,  would  tolerate  occasional  disturbances  without 
alleviation, accepting them as a reasonable cost of maintaining the best structure of relative prices 
and as a means for preventing a continual accumulation of basic maladjustments which could only 
issue politically in disruption of the system itself.” (Simons (1936/48), p. 172) 
 
Secondly, within the decisions on the design of the economic order, Simons shows that the different fields of 
economic  policy  (competition,  monetary,  foreign  trade  etc.)  are  intricately  interwoven  and  that  every 
decision on one field should be analysed as to its impulses it generates on the other fields. A good 
example would be the relationship between competition policy and the necessity for monetary reform. 
Simons shows here that monetary reforms would be of little help if his competitive framework concept is 
not simultaneously implemented: If the latter is not the case, the rigidity of the monopolistic price system 
will make it impossible to the economy to handle adverse shocks, regardless how intelligently its monetary 
system is devised. Policy measures are thus to be conceived in terms of their encompassing effects on the 
various fields of an economic order and not only according to its immediately visible consequences in its 
specific policy field. 
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Let us briefly summarize the core elements of Simons’ theory of order: 
￿  Government is to be thought of as a democracy and only democracy-compatible tasks are to be 
assigned to it. 
￿  This democratic government is highly important (is in a division of labor with the private actors) 
and has for this reason has to permanently pursue a number of positive policies, i.e. is not to be 
rolled back by negative policies. 
￿  These positive policies are not primarily aimed at providing specific services, but at providing a 
general framework within which the private individuals are free to transact. 
￿  This framework is to be designed in a manner which maximally destroys the power concentration in the 
economy  (in  all  fields  of  economic  policy)  and  in  government  itself  (by  federalism, 
decentralization and the rule of law). 
￿  Democracy can only find a consensus on rules, not on discretionary measures. For this reason the 
framework is to consist of these consensual rules (interpersonally clear and intertemporally stable). 
￿  The framework is the extension of the constitutional approach from politics on the field of the 
economy. 
￿  Consisting of rules, the framework is aimed at establishing the rules of the game, not at interfering in 
the moves of the game, i.e. not at interfering in the relative prices and wages in the economy. 
￿  All societal orders (economic order, political order, legal order etc.) are highly interdependent. Also, 
all measures of economic policy are to be analyzed interdependently, i.e. as a consistent program 
in their impact on all societal orders and on all fields of economic policy. 
 
In the following section two concrete fields of the positive program will be depicted for showing the 
application of the above principles on practical economic policy. 
 
2.2  Economic policy implications 
Having thus reviewed the theoretical approach of Simons and its central topos - that coincides with a rule-
based  economic  policy  which  is  again  intended  to  safeguard  the  order  of  rules  -  it  is  helpful  to 
complement this abstract view with the proposed institutional framework and specific proposals in the 
field of economic policy. 
 
For the sake of explanation, we concentrate on Simons’ “sound liberal strategy”, which offers a pointed 
summary of his positive program (Simons (1936/48), p. 170) .Simons defines three objectives that mirror 
“requirements” of such a “sound liberal strategy” and discloses three proposals of institutional reform:  
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1.  “Restoration of a maximum of competitiveness in industry (including the labor markets). 
2.  “Transition to a less preposterous structure of private money contracts and. 
3.  “Ultimate establishment of a simple, mechanical rule of monetary policy.” (Simons (1936/48) p. 
170) 
 
We therefore focus on competition policy first and discuss the monetary policy and proposals to monetary 
reform thereafter. Since foreign trade related issues are also subject to the first part, we discuss them 
simultaneously. A discussion of interdependency - especially with regard to other complement positive 
elements of the sound liberal program - will follow in section 3.  
 
2.2.1  The positive program and competition policy 
Power and its maximum limitation are the main goals of competition policy in Simons’ oeuvre. The effects 
of power concentration are extremely dangerous not only to the economy itself but, in the sense of the 
above mentioned interdependence of orders, to society as a whole. The following quote already hints to 
the wide range of the disempowerment program: 
“A cardinal tenet of the libertarians is that no one may be trusted with much power - no leader, 
no faction, no party, no “class”, no majority, no government, no church, no corporation, no trade 
association, no university, no large organization of any kind. They must forever repeat with Lord 
Acton: “Power always corrupts” - and not merely those who exercise it but those subject to it and 
the whole society.” (Simons (1945/48), p. 23) 
 
Let us in the following limit ourselves to the economic order, i.e. to the issue as to how competition can 
be made effective so that it can achieve its disempowering virtues. In the agenda description in the 
“Positive Program”, the general title of this section already bears the core of Simons’ long-run goal: 
“Elimination of private monopoly in all its forms” (Simons (1934/48), p. 57). This statement of aims 
contains two aspects which are constitutive to the competition policy: 1) private power is unbearable to 
Simons and has to be destroyed, its destruction is to him the “sine qua non” (ibid) of the whole of 
economic policy and: 2) in all its forms signifies that there are many facets of monopoly, i.e. that it is a 
phenomenon not only possible in commodity markets but also prevalent in other spheres, e.g. on the 
labor market. 
 
How does Simons envision the realization of this long-run goal? The test which he wants to apply to every 
single market of the economy is to whether competition on this market is theoretically possible (most 
individual markets) or if due to technical reasons it is not feasible (natural monopolies). The two cases are 
to be handled in diametrically different manners:  
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“It [the principle of avoidance of the regulation expedient, EK/SK] implies that every industry 
should be either effectively competitive or socialized and that governments should plan definitely 
on  socialization  of  the  railroads  and  utilities  and  of  every  other  industry  where  competitive 
conditions cannot be preserved.” (Simons (1945/48), pp. 57-58) 
What is necessary for the first case is an “outright dismantling of our gigantic corporations” (Simons 
(1945/48), p. 58). The dismantling is to be applied as an absolute rule and not to be a matter of discretion 
by authority.6 For this to be attained, he develops a ““new deal” with respect to private corporation” (ibid) 
which contains numerous provisions which are to be changed or added to the laws of corporation. These 
measures include the limitation of corporations possessing other corporations (in the sense of holdings), 
the maximum size of a corporation, the types of securities which a corporation is allowed to issue, the 
special  institution  of  an  investment  corporation  (the  only  one  allowed  to  hold  stocks  of  other 
corporations), the prohibition of officials to work for different companies in the same line of business and 
issues  of  taxation  of  corporate  earnings  (Simons  (1934/48),  pp.  58-60).  In  addition,  horizontal 
combinations of corporations should be prohibited altogether and vertical integration allowed only if it is 
assessed as useful for competition (Simons (1934/48), p. 59). 
 
An important way for Simons towards destroying power of the monopolistic corporations is, apart from 
the above changes in the rules of existing markets, free foreign trade: 
“To achieve free trade would be to realize, directly and indirectly, most of the decentralization 
that libertarians propose.” (Simons (1945/48), p. 24) 
Interestingly, he stresses this channel more in his later writings (as the “Political Credo” from where this 
quote is taken or about the relevance of free foreign trade to international cartels in Simons (1943/48), pp. 
248-249), whereas in his early writings, most notably the “Positive Program”, he develops the sizable 
package of regulation described above. 
 
When it comes to the second case, the one of natural monopolies, Simons takes a path remarkable for a 
libertarian, the one of socialization. The reason for this solution, which does not seem intuitive for a 
liberal, is his disappointment with the regulation of natural monopolies in reality. Private power, be it here 
or in the monetary sphere, is absolutely not admissible, and even regulated private natural monopolies 
would still possess power. Simons seems to be aware of the problems which this visionary solution raises, 
e.g.  in  the  capacity  of  administration  to  run  its  own  natural  monopolies,  and  thus  pleas  for 
experimentation in the different locations to find the best solution (Simons (1934/48), p. 61-62). 
 
As mentioned above, these disempowering principles are to be applied not only to commodity markets. 
Simons sees the explicit necessity to subject especially the labor market to such a disempowerment. In his 
                                                       
6 Simons uses here the term “rule of reason” to describe the possible arbitrariness of that discretionary policies which 
he wishes to ban, a term encountered today to describe the EU’s new doctrine on competition policy.  
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later  essays,  the  issue of  trade-union power seems  even  more  dangerous than power  on  the side of 
corporations (Stein (1987), p. 334). If the enterprise side of the economy is decentralized by the above 
program, then there is no reason to stick to the privileges which unions have accrued over time. They can 
be useful but have to be deprived of their privileges, since if not they tend to be special interest groups of 
different ranks of workers and this again is a sign of private power (Simons (1944/48b), p. 128-129). Of 
course, disempowering the unions is a tremendously difficult task for practical policy, but Simons hopes 
that, if the enterprise side is decentralized, public opinion will realize how dangerous union power can be 
and will side with the competition policy for the labor market (Simons (1934/48), p. 60-61). Let us 
conclude with a statement which he coins for the labor market but is the credo of his stance on the whole 
of competition policy: 
  “Monopoly power must be abused. It has no use save abuse.” (Simons (1944/48b), p. 129) 
For this reason, the competitive order has to permanently fight it, be it in the field or corporate law, 
foreign trade or the constitution of the labor markets. 
 
2.2.2  The positive program and monetary reform 
Friedman’s re-discussion of Simon’s monetary contributions in 1967 offers an adequate starting point for 
an  assessment  of  Simons’  perspective  on  money  and  his  envisaged  monetary  framework.  Friedman 
introduces his review on Simons by highlighting that Simons wrote on money “mostly during the dozen 
years from 1933 to 1945.” This period is considered, “thanks to the Keynesian Revolution” and due to the 
war-time monetary policy, as a phase when money especially “in the sense of currency, deposits, banking, 
and allied issues” became “an unimportant and uninteresting subject” (Friedman (1967), p.2). Simons 
therefore concentrated on monetary issues in a time when “the fraction of the profession’s attention 
devoted to this area probably reached an all time low from the late ‘thirties to the early ‘fifties” (Friedman 
(1967), p.2). This insight reveals that Simons’ ideas were not subject to an intensive review process by the 
time they were elaborated. At last in 1967, Friedman unconditionally approves Simons’ focal point in 
monetary economics, “that monetary stability is an essential prerequisite for economic stability” (Friedman 
(1967), p.2). Simons’ institutional arrangements, however, do not withstand Friedman’s closer scrutiny 
especially with regard to the reform of the banking system. 
 
Before we discuss why Friedman did not appraise Simons’ institutional proposal but acquiesces Simons’ 
principal argument what monetary policy should strive for, we first sum up Simons proposals to the 
reform of monetary institutions and policy, respectively. 
 
Simons’  two  objectives  are:  first,  to  reform  the  monetary  institutions  especially  towards  a  “less 
preposterous structure of private money contracts” and, secondly to establish a “simple, mechanical rule 
of monetary policy” (Simons (1936/48), p. 170). 
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The first objective is reflected by the Chicago Plan, which is generally traced back to Irving Fisher (1935) 
and calls for a 100 per cent reserve for deposits held by individuals at any commercial bank to keep 
checking banks 100% liquid. The main goal of the plan is to “prevent inflation and deflation” and to “cure 
or prevent depressions” as well as “to wipe out much of the National Debt”, as Irving Fisher puts it in the 
subtitle of the first edition of his book “100 % Money” (Fisher (1935/45)).  The initial idea is to cut back 
the commercial banks’ ability to increase the money stock by credit and by issuing loans as much as 
monopolistic  monetary  regimes  might  allow  for.  Before  we  discuss  further  elements  in  detail,  it  is 
important to highlight Fisher’s preface to the first edition of this long debated plan in 1935: 
“I am also under obligation to several economists including especially Professor Henry C. Simons, 
Mr. Aaron Director, Professor Frank H. Knight, Professor Garfield V. Cox, Professor Lloyd W. 
Mints, Professor Henry Schultz, Professor Paul H. Douglas, Mr. A. G. Hart, and others, all 
members of a group at the University of Chicago from whose “memorandum” on the 100% plan 
I originally abstained many of the ideas embodied in this book. Professor Simons, in particular, 
has given generously of his time in personal consultation, as well as in going over parts of the 
manuscript.” (Preface of the first edition, re-printed in third edition in Fisher (1935/45), p. xiii)) 
 
This  quote  underlines  why  the  100%  plan  is  considered  a  Chicagoan  Plan  and  it  highlights  the 
contribution of Henry Simons as a key and most prominent member of the Chicagoan group on its way to 
100 per cent money. Another proof for this assumption is the proposal for banking reform by Simons and 
his Chicagoan colleagues of 1931 that circulated as a “mimeographed memorandum titled “Banking and 
Currency Reform” among economist since late 1933” (Simons (1936/48), Fn. 2, p. 326, see also Simons 
(1933)). 
 
Simons makes use of the minimum reserve to assure for 100 per cent banking. Understood as a variation 
of an existing monetary rule within the already chosen monopolistic monetary regime, Simons’ proposal 
reflects a choice in accordance to the relative absolute absolutes analogy of Frank Knight that was later 
revitalized in the perspective of Constitutional Political Economy by James Buchanan. The quality of such 
a choice needs to be subject to a general analysis about the consequences of a 100 per cent minimum 
reserve. From a historical perspective we can only attest that this proposal was a conjointly agreed upon 
instrument by 1945 in economics. It is quite remarkable that the “constitutional central banking” school, 
that was initially represented by the “Currency School” in the 19th century, “favored a 100 per cent rule, 
too” (White (1999), p. 219). 
 
The second call for monetary reform is once again directed on a change of relative absolute absolute of 
the monopolistic monetary constitution - which is the rule that the monetary basis should be fixed - or to 
speak in Simons’ words: to “fix the quantity of circulation media” (Simons (1936/48), p. 164). Simons 
favors such a rigid rule as very “attractive as a principle of monetary policy” for the following four 
reasons:  
13 
1.  “it avoids reliance on discretionary (dictatorial, arbitrary) action by and independent monetary 
authority  and  defines  a  statutory  rule  which  might  be  enacted  by  the  competent  legislature 
without delegation of its powers. 
2.  it  provides  automatically  for  downward  adjustment  of  commodity  prices  as  output  expands 
through improvement in technical efficiency. 
3.  it represents a rule which, from the viewpoint of a contractual enterprise economy, is ideally 
definite and simple and 
4.  it is clear enough and reasonable enough to provide the basis of a new “religion on money” 
around  which  might  be  regimented  strong  sentiments  against  tinkering  with  the  currency.” 
(Simons (1936/48), p. 163) 
 
Referring to the first point, one has good reason to prove his devotion to rules as well as his rejection of 
discretional  arrangements  in  areas  which  could  better  and  easier  be  executed  by  rule  or  automatic 
mechanisms. This is why he also rejects a too high degree of granted independence since it might offer 
space for discretion. It also appears, especially with regard to the second point, that Simons does not 
believe in the rule-following behavior of central bankers. These two reasons for fixing the monetary 
supply also mirror the historicity of Simons argument: Having the Gold Standard as an implicit reference 
in mind, it does not surprise that Simons want to see central bank react on price shocks as if gold was the 
restraint of monetary policy. Rejecting gold as a means to these problems, Simons’ monetary proposal 
must be circled around a simple fixed monetary supply rule – which is enriched with a rigid 100% rule. 
From a broader view, one can legitimately pose the question if there would be any big difference between 
Murray Rothbard’s 100% gold proposal and Simons 100% fixed monetary rule proposal, if we would rule 
out gold. It becomes very clear now why Friedman did not follow Simons on the ground of the fixed 
monetary supply idea since he found out in his and Anna Schwartz’ path breaking study on the monetary 
history of the United States that the Fed reacted too restrictively on the break out of the banking crisis of 
1929 and the emergence of the Great Depression thereafter (Friedman/Schwartz (1963)). Friedman offers 
an  explanation  for  this  error  in  Simons’  work:  Simons  was  too  much  concerned  about  stability  and 
misinterpreted the consequences of too rigid monetary institutions – under a monopolistic monetary 
regime as we might add. These assumptions are perfectly reflected in points three and four. Simons was 
aware that the combination of 100 percent and fixed supply would cause an increase of the velocity and 
therefore would increase the variability in the amounts of “near-moneys” (Simons (1936/48), p. 164). 
 
Now that we know that Simons was an adherent of narrow banking, we need to focus on his further 
proposals to also streamline the banking sector under this criterion. Again, Simons considers 100 per cent 
and  a  fixed  monetary  supply  only  as  a  “first  step  toward  reconstruction  of  our  whole  financial 
organization. Standing by itself, as an isolated measure, it would promise little but evasion (…) and would 
deserve  classification  as  merely  another  crank  scheme”  as  he  notes  in  his  well-known  “Rules  vs. 
Authorities” article (Simons (1936/48), Fn. 17, p. 331). The abolition of private deposit banking should  
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therefore  be  accompanied  by  a  “drastic  limitation  on  the  formal  borrowing  powers  of  all  private 
corporations and especially borrowing short term”. These so called “near moneys” should be minimized 
by a sharp restriction in bank regulation – especially to unfold the effects of a fixed money supply rule 
(Simons  (1936/48),  p.182).  Simons  knows  that  these  instruments  for  monetary  reform  can  only  be 
successfully implemented in the long run. He therefore pleas for a constant price index as an alternative, 
second-best monetary policy rule. The flipside is, however, – as Simon himself admits – that it is hardly 
manageable without interventions into the market process: As an integral part of the monetary policy, 
government should be capable to intervene on markets for price stabilization matters (Simons (1936/48), 
p. 173). This somewhat surprises, given the harsh rejection of discretion for the institutional design of the 
monetary arena. Although he knows that his solution is “unsatisfying”, he states that the “ultimate control 
over the value of money lies in fiscal practices – in the spending, taxing, and borrowing operations of the 
central government” (Simons (1936/48), p. 175). Here, Simons grants the Treasury “within wide limits to 
alter the form of the public debt – to shift from long term to short term borrowing of vice versa, to issue 
and retire demand obligations in a legal tender form” (Simons (1936/48), p. 175). Although Simons 
acknowledges that this scheme clearly requires the delegation of large administrative powers, he argues 
that this issue “need not concern us here”, which might have attracted Monetarists to devitalize his 
somewhat ambiguous plan. If we finally compare his monetary and fiscal proposals, it seems that they are 
somewhat inconsistent with regard to the rules vs. discretion paradigm, which has surely contributed to 
the uniform appraisal of Simons’ monetary legacy (for a first debate see Davis (1968), Davis (1969)). A 
discussion of the subsequent contributions with respect to this matter will follow in a later version of the 
paper (see e.g. the Simons-Minsky connection by Whalen (1988)). 
 
3. The influence of the “Old Chicagoan” Simons on Hayek and Ordo-liberalism 
This chapter is focused on the striking similarities in the “triangle” Simons, Walter Eucken and Friedrich 
August von Hayek in the 1930s and 1940s. This period can be seen as the decisive decades both for 
Simons and for Eucken when it comes to the formulation of their “theories of order” (to use a term of 
Eucken) and the respective economic policy implications. For Hayek, these are the decades where he 
leaves “technical economics” and starts exploring the field of social philosophy. We cannot provide an 
encompassing report of the biographical details here (for the development of the Freiburg School see 
Goldschmidt/Wohlgemuth (2008), for Hayek’s evolution in that period as compared to later positions see 
Kolev (2010)), instead we can only pinpoint the intellectual proximities which can be found out in the 
triangle. Since unfortunately the Eucken archives are still completely unexplored and - due to geographical 
constraints - we had no access yet to the Simons archives at Chicago (which we would like to review 
directly after the HES meeting), we choose a twofold strategy for this chapter. In the first section, our aim 
is to delineate the similarities in thought as can be found in three major publications (Simons’ posthumous 
essay collection “Economic policy for a Free Society” of 1948, Eucken’s posthumous “Principles of 
Economic Policy” of 1952 and Hayek’s “Road to Serfdom” of 1944) as well as in their contribution  
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towards competition policy advice and monetary reform of this period. In a second step, we analyse the 
papers and minutes which Eucken, Hayek and Aaron Director (as a disciple of the deceased Simons)7 
presented at the founding meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. Their discussion on the necessities 
of a competitive order (as opposed to the laissez-faire prescription to economic policy) rounds up the 
picture of the parallel search for a positive program of the three protagonists. The papers are discussed 
here in the form they are available at the Hayek archive microfilm copy at Duke University which Stefan 
Kolev visited in the fall of 2010. 8 
 
3.1  Similarities in publications 
Taking into consideration the impact of the Great Depression on the scholarly discourse in economics, it 
is not surprising that Simons, Eucken and Hayek have focused on the problem how the economy could 
be improved by rules and institution to allow for a better economic process than under the pre-crisis 
economic order. This objective is mirrored in the publications of three scholars between the 1930s and 
1940s. This is why we argue that Simons, Eucken and Hayek have conjointly shared a research program in 
this period. 
 
3.1.1  Comparison of the theoretical approaches to economics 
To begin with, the strategic position of Simons, Eucken and Hayek vis-à-vis their intellectual surrounding 
in  that  period  is  thoroughly  comparable.  The supporters  of  liberalism  in  the  classical  sense  are  in a 
defensive position, not to say in isolation in their respective countries. Simons, when writing his “Positive 
Program  for  Laissez-faire”  in  1934,  is  confronted  with  the  overwhelming  support  which  Roosevelt 
receives for the New Deal and the fight against the Great Depression which the public acknowledges. 
Only some years later, with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the widely received book by Walter 
Lippmann (Lippmann (1937)), the non-conformists to the Roosevelt program reach some consolidation 
(although it is notable that Lippmann does not quote Simons in his book a single time). The same is true 
for Eucken and his friends and disciples in Germany. From 1933 on, the small group around him in 
Freiburg consolidates but remains in an acutely endangered position at the geographical periphery of the 
Reich. Opposing Martin Heidegger during the summer term of 1933 in the university council, Eucken 
becomes isolated like his close friend Edmund Husserl at the University of Freiburg. Not only on a 
regional scale but also the entire national university system is subject to a triumphant procession of the 
“Völkische Wirtschaftslehre” (“national socialist economics”). Departed disciples of the younger historical 
School, like Werner Sombart, mistakenly believe that “their time” has come. The field of economics 
becomes a more and more “interventionist” discipline with a harsh rejection of classical liberalism. Many 
German economists adopt more or less willingly the Nazi agenda (for more details of the economists’ 
                                                       
7  For  Director’s  statement  about  his  relation  to  Simons:  “I  never  took  a  course  from  him,  but  I  was  greatly 
influenced by him”, see Kitch (1983), p. 179. 
8 We wish to thank the estate of F. A. Hayek for granting us the permission to quote from his correspondence.  
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Nazi involvement, see Janssen (1998/09)), others, like Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow, leave the 
country very soon after the Nazi accession to power. “Half-exiles” (Johnson (1989), p.40) like Eucken and 
his  group,  who  in  the  late  1930s  start  organising  intellectual  resistance  circles  in  Freiburg.  Eucken’s 
standing as well as that of his colleagues becomes increasingly difficult after 1942 and finally culminates in 
interrogation and arrests after the assassination attempt at Hitler in July 1944. Hayek leaves Austria on 
time, but after a short period of being a young “star” in London, he is gradually abandoned by his most 
promising students who change sides and join Keynes’s side of the field (Hicks (1967)). After the opening 
the second round of the socialist calculation debates in 1935, Hayek becomes extremely alienated both vis-
à-vis  the  protagonists  of  the  “Keynesian  avalanche”  (McCormick  (1992))  and  vis-à-vis  the  market 
socialists, being thus thoroughly isolated when writing his fundamental essay “Freedom and the Economic 
System” (Hayek (1939)) and even more so in the Cambridge years when finishing “The Road to Serfdom” 
(Hayek (1944/94)). Therefore, Simons, Eucken and Hayek all share a somewhat comparable situation, 
which is characterized by a principal rejection of their research program by their surrounding academic 
communities and by a deep concern about individual liberty. 
 
Having described the intellectual isolation of these dispersed liberal thinkers: What can be said about 
mutual influences in their intellectual pursuits? For the time being, i.e. with currently no access to the 
Eucken and the Simons papers, it will be difficult to speak of clear-cut “influences”. We do know from a 
secondary source that there is an early letter from Hayek to Simons acknowledging the appreciation of the 
“Positive Program” by Hayek (see the mentioning of the 1934 letter in Van Horn/Mirowski (2009), 
p.142). Eucken quotes Simons three times in his “Principles”, both with respect the general program of 
the competitive order (Eucken (1952/04), p. 255) and to concrete fields of economic policy (monetary 
reform: Eucken (1952/04), p. 260; and with regard to patents: Eucken (1952/04), p. 269). We found at 
Duke a letter of Hayek to Director from February 14th 1947 in which Hayek prepares Director for the 
joint presentations of Eucken and Director at the “”Free Enterprise” and Competitive Order” session at 
the MPS from which it becomes clear that Eucken is not known to Director (Hayek (1947)). 9 But due to 
the non-accessibility of the Eucken papers, we cannot be sure whether there is a direct impact from 
Simons to Eucken. Thus in the following we work with the hypothesis that Hayek is the “hub” in the 
triangle, being in intense contact both with Simons and Eucken (he later acknowledges both of them 
among “those who have contributes most to shaping my ideas”, Hayek (1960/78), p. 415). Concrete and 
provable  “impacts”  or  “influences”,  despite  such  an  acknowledgement  or  the  parallel  mentioning  of 
Hayek’s importance on Simons’ liberalism (Simons (1945/48), p. 1), are difficult to be established at our 
stage of archival knowledge: Thus we would like to speak of parallel tracks which the three protagonists 
pursue in the 1930s and the 1940s. But, as we will see in the following, they are really surprisingly parallel for 
it to be a coincidence. 
 
                                                       
9 We wish to thank the estate of F. A. Hayek for granting us the permission to quote from his correspondence.   
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The proximity in the individual three sides of our triangle Simons-Eucken-Hayek has already been noticed 
by other authors (see e.g. Wegmann (2002), pp. 135-141, Plickert (2008), pp. 80-86 and Van Horn (2009), 
pp. 209-213) but in our eyes this issue deserves additional attention, particularly to be seen as an integrated 
figure and not as individual sides. 
 
Simons, Eucken and Hayek develop in the 1930s and 1940s a plea against laissez-faire as the guiding principle 
of liberal economic policy. As the title of Simons’ most well-known essay of 1934 shows, laissez-faire is to 
be  understood  as  a  condition  in  which  government  does  not do  “nothing”  but,  instead,  where  it  is 
developing and implementing positive economic policy. See the following quote: 
“The representation of laissez faire as a merely do-nothing policy is unfortunate and misleading. 
[…] The great errors of economic policy in the last century may be defined [...] in terms of 
disastrous neglect of the positive responsibilities of government of government under a free-
enterprise system.” (Simons (1934/48), p. 42) 
The stance of Eucken and Hayek on this central point is almost identical to Simons’: 
“What was the core of laissez-faire economic policy? The answer is most commonly: It was the 
age of a “government-free” economy. […] The economic policy of laissez-faire was founded on 
the conviction that suitable market forms, thus a well-functioning economic order, would evolve 
from  the  spontaneous  forces  of  society,  if  only  liberty  and  the  rule  of  law  are  guaranteed.” 
(Eucken (1952/04), pp. 26-27) 
as well as: 
“Probably nothing has done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of some 
liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the principle of laissez faire. […] The question 
whether the state should or should not “act” or “interfere” poses an altogether false alternative, 
and the term “laissez faire” is a highly ambiguous and misleading description of the principles on 
which a liberal policy is based.” (Hayek (1944/94), p. 21 and p. 89) 
 
Instead of pleading for this 19th century rule of thumb, equally passionately discarded by Walter Lippmann 
in  the  “manifesto”  of  this  generation  of  new  liberals  (Lippmann  (1937/44),  pp.  184-192),  the  three 
protagonists of the current paper plea for a role of government which is centered around the concept of a 
framework, or in other words of the “rules of the game” metaphor. Government is to establish and implement 
the rules, within which the private individuals are free to act and interact as they wish. Since this was 
already explained in section 2.1 with respect to Simons, only three quotations should suffice here to 
indicate the almost identical perception of this concept with Simons, Eucken and Hayek: 
“It is an obvious responsibility of the state under this policy to maintain the kind of legal and 
institutional  framework  within  which  competition  can  function  effectively  as  an  agency  of 
control.” (Simons (1934/48), p. 42) 
as well as:  
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“As the rule of law, the competitive order creates a framework, in which the free action of the 
individual is limited by the sphere of liberty of the other individual and thus human liberty areas 
come into harmony.” (Eucken (1952/04), p. 250) 
as well as: 
“The functioning of competition not only requires adequate organisation of certain institutions 
like money, markets and channels of information […] but it depends, above all, on the existence 
of an appropriate legal system, a legal system [on p. 45 synonymously called “legal framework”, 
EK/SK]  designed  both  to  preserve  competition  and  to  make  it  operate  as  beneficially  as 
possible.” (Hayek (1944/94), p. 43) 
 
This is, in effect, nothing less than the plea for an application of the “constitutional principle” of legal scholars 
to the economy, and thus all three authors speak of an “economic constitution” which comprises the rules of 
the legal framework into an integrated and harmonious whole. But what are “good”, “fitting” rules, i.e. 
what is the criterion for deciding whether a specific rule, e.g. in the field of liability, is suitable for a liberal 
economic constitution? There is a very far-reaching similarity between Simons and Eucken here: It is the 
aspect of disempowering which comes into play here. In Hayek of the 1930s and 1940s, this aspect is also 
present: 
“To split or decentralize power is necessary to reduce the absolute amount of power, and the 
competitive  system  is  the  only  system  designed  to  minimize  by  decentralization  the  power 
exercised by man over man.” (Hayek (1944/94), p. 160) 
The disempowerment aspect is, however, not as central to Hayek (in the sense of a topos) as it is for 
Simons  and  Eucken.  For  the  Chicago/Freiburg  scholars,  the  goal  of  disempowerment  is  the  most 
essential merit of competition and the competitive order in their “theories of order”: 
“In government the power of men may be limited by constitutional-conventional rules. […] The 
best single device, in business organization, is the limit the power of officials by keeping their 
organizations under the severe discipline of competition.” (Simons (1945/48), p. 37) 
as well as: 
“Economic power can exist in the competitive order only to the extent which is necessary for the 
maintenance of the competitive order itself. […] First principle of economic policy: The policy of 
government has to be directed to the destruction or the limiting of power groups.” (Eucken 
(1952/04), p. 291 and p. 334) 
 
Thus,  competition  as  a  disempowering  procedure  has  to  be  set  in  motion  by  the  government’s  installing  a 
framework (in the sense of economic constitution) which Simons, Eucken and Hayek call a competitive order. 
The role of the rule of law in this type of economic policy is seminal: As we saw above, the competitive 
order is the extension of the constitutional principle on the economy, so a framework-based economic 
policy has, above all, to comply with the requirements of the rule of law. This is underscored manifold by 
the three authors.  
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We  thus  see  that  the  type  of  solution  for  the  problems  of  economic  policy  of  the  three  authors  is 
extremely homogeneous, if not almost identical! They discard laissez-faire as an operational maxim for 
liberalism and instead work out a new philosophy which can be called “laissez-faire within rules”. Individual 
economic agents are free to extend their liberty and welfare as far as they abide by the rules of the 
competitive order. Government is also restrained by these same rules, so the goal is to attain a societal 
entity (as a combination of economy, society and government) where arbitrariness and power are brought 
to a minimum and, via rules, liberty to an (orderly, i.e. non-chaotic) maximum. 
 
As a last point, it seems noteworthy that this absolutely central role of government as arbiter is not the only 
function which the “new liberals” assign to their ideal government. In addition, they see also government 
as a provider of specific services which society, if left to itself, would insufficiently produce. This service 
function of government (if it comes to e.g. an inequality-reducing progressive taxation and thus financed 
“socialized consumption” in Simons, an inequality-reducing progressive taxation in Eucken or a minimum 
income, sanitary measures etc. in Hayek) distinguishes these liberal thinkers of the 1930s and 1940s from 
liberal contemporaries like Ludwig von Mises or, even more so, Ayn Rand, and has induced today’s 
extreme  libertarians  like  Hans-Hermann  Hoppe  to  convict  Hayek  of  being  an  interventionist,  or,  in 
Hoppe’s  own  words,  a  “social  democrat”  (Hoppe  (1994),  p.  67).  In  our  opinion,  this  judgement  is 
unwarranted and commits precisely the same mistake as the futile “classical liberal” vs. “interventionist” 
debate  about  Simons  mentioned  in  section  two  of  the  paper:  The  Simons-Eucken-Hayek  type  of 
liberalism  underscores  that  the  interaction  of  individuals  on  free  markets  has  absolutely  necessary 
prerequisites, which they try to depict by the combination of an arbiter function and a service function of 
government. 
 
3.1.2  Comparison of competition policy proposals 
Directly corresponding to the issue of power and disempowerment above, on the field of competition 
policy Hayek’s role in the triangle is not focal. Due to the non-centrality of the disempowerment topos for 
him, competition policy is largely underrated in his oeuvre, as Fritz Machlup remarks when revising early 
versions of the “Constitution of Liberty” (Machlup (1956)).10 Thus, the comparative analysis here will 
concentrate on Simons’ and Eucken’s policy advice. 
 
The agendas of Chicago and Freiburg bear strong similarities when it comes to the concrete aspects of the 
competition policy issue. In the first place, both Simons and Eucken discuss the necessity to enable 
competition and to make it function as effectively as possible. The term “competitive order”, which, as 
already mentioned many times, is the general material description of their positive program, bears the 
                                                       
10 We wish to thank the estate of F. A. Hayek for granting us the permission to quote from his correspondence.  
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centrality of competition in itself. Both Simons and Eucken see a seminal role of opening markets and of 
free trade as an important condition for the enabling of competition, but both of them (unlike e.g. Mises 
and the later Hayek) do not see open markets as a sufficient condition for competition to be established. 
Instead, they formulate many additional provisions which in their eyes are vital: For both Simons and 
Eucken, the size of market players is a problem since it goes along with power. Simons, as described 
above, envisages various steps to limit the maximum size of corporations (Simons (1934/48), pp. 58-60). 
Eucken  formulates  the  vision  of  complete  competition  (not  identical  with  neo-classical  perfect 
competition) which is characterized by a situation where the individual players are dispossessed of the 
power to influence the market price (Eucken (1952/04), pp. 245-250). 
 
A further important similarity of the Chicago-Freiburg competition policy concepts is that they are not 
limited to the issue of size (and the related issue of prohibition of monopolies and cartels). Instead, both 
Simons and Eucken stress at various places that the aim of effective competition can only be reached by 
an encompassing, integrated approach which is targeted at all fields of economic policy. In this regard, 
they always mention the futility of competition policy in the narrow sense if it is not supplemented by 
fighting  power  and  concentration  in  neighbouring  fields  like  corporate  law,  patent  law,  tax  law  etc. 
Compare the two quotes: 
“More narrowly, it [monopoly reform, EK/SK] is a problem of depriving corporations of powers 
and privileges which were unwisely granted, have been patently abused, and are quite unnecessary 
for effective organization or efficient operation and management. Our whole corporate law, like 
our patent law, needs complete overhauling.” (Simons (1941/48), p. 101) 
as well as: 
“Trade policy, corporate law, tax policy, cartel law and cartel legislation, and, overall, the entire 
business law enabled and facilitated the creation of monopolies [e.g. in Germany in the 1920s, 
EK/SK].  […]  The  situation  in  the  competitive  order  is  completely  different.  Here  the  main 
direction is another one. The arising of monopolistic power bodies is prevented here. And this 
not only by a cartel prohibition but – and this is much more important – by an economic and 
legal policy which helps the powerful competitive tendencies in the modern economy to dominate 
by the realization of the constitutive principles [of the competitive order, EK/SK].” (Eucken 
(1952/04), pp. 292-293) 
 
When it comes to the concrete steps by which the economy is to be disempowered, the measures of 
Simons and Eucken differ. They have the common formal characteristic that can be seen as wide-ranging 
interventions into the economic process. But substantively, they differ. The most important difference is 
the treatment of natural monopolies which, according to both of them, are a difficult case to manage and 
will remain non-competitive due to their specificity. Here Simons pleas for a socialization of natural 
monopoly since he sees the danger of governmental regulation authority (being in his eyes “halfhearted, 
sporadic, principle-less”) as too large (Simons (1934/48), pp. 50-51). Eucken weighs the alternatives in the  
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contrary way: To him, a socialization would mean a maximization of (private and governmental) power 
and, since in his perspective the power problem can never be solved by a further concentration of power, 
he opts for a regulation of the natural monopolies’ prices by a governmental regulation authority via 
ensuring prices identical to the counter-factual competitive situation which he calls “as-if competition” 
(Eucken (1952/04), pp. 293-295). 
 
To finish this section with a similarity between Chicago and Freiburg, both Simons and Eucken are 
adherents of a competition policy which is not only aimed at commodity markets but explicitly also at the 
labor market. The power topos is not restrained to corporations but also to the supply side of the labor 
market. Once the power problem of corporations is solved, neither Simons nor Eucken see the necessity 
for sticking to the privileges of unions which have historically been granted with the justification that 
equilibration of power (vis-à-vis monopolistic corporations) is necessary (Simons (1944/48b), pp. 153-155 
as well as Eucken (1952/04), pp. 294-295). 
 
3.1.3  Comparison of monetary reform proposals 
This section summarizes arguments that support our hypothesis that Hayek is a missing link between 
Simons and Eucken: A good reason is that Hayek indeed is the “hub” between Simon’s and Eucken’s 
surprising parallelity in their work on monetary reform: Eucken quotes Hayek with regard to the Chicago 
Plan. Apart from these direct proofs, we would like to show the like-minded approach to monetary 
economics and the proposals for monetary reform between Simons and Eucken. 
  
A systematic similarity can be found if we take a closer look on Eucken’s main starting point in search for 
his “positive program”: As Eucken argues, “the industrialized economy needs monetary stability as a 
prerequisite for implementing a well functioning steering mechanism” (Eucken (1949), p. 76). However, as 
he notes further, “the industrialized economy is characterized by an inherence of monetary instability”. 
The reason for the immanent monetary instability emerges in his view from an insufficiently designed 
monetary order (Folz 1970). This disclosed antagonism of the modern, credit based economy is also 
shared by Simons and undoubtedly by Hayek, as his contribution from the mid 1930s undoubtedly testify. 
Eucken  (1950)  characterizes  the  modern  monetary  economy  as  dominated  by  the  “third  monetary 
system”, emerging interdependently along with the economic development of the 19th century and causing 
the inherent instability. Thus, because monetary stability can be, in Eucken’s view, safeguarded only by a 
well-shaped  monetary  and  economic  order,  and  because  the  emerged  third  monetary  system  -  as  a 
dominant feature of a modern economy - does not lead to monetary stability, this system “needs to be 
replaced” (Eucken (1952/04), p.311). This very strong argument against the status quo is also reflected by 
Simons’  contribution  of  1936.  It  is  astonishing,  however,  that  Eucken  directly  cites  Simons  while 
submitting his central part of the “principles of economics policy”, which underpins the direct influence 
of Simons on Eucken (see Eucken (1952/04), Fn. 2, p.255).  
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Eucken  principal  argument  what  the  monetary  framework  and  monetary  policy  should strive for,  is, 
however, not simply “copied” from Simons’ papers but moreover the product of his methodological 
perspective, i.e. Eucken’s systematic analysis of the monetary system which is missing in Simon’s critique 
on the monetary framework: Eucken distinguishes between three monetary systems (Eucken (1950), p. 
163). Within the first monetary system, money is created by the use of a certain commodity as money 
(Eucken  (1950),  p.165).  The  defining  feature  of  this  system  is  the  “money-commodity  link”,  i.e. 
individuals can decide whether they want to gain utility from the use of the monetary character or from 
the commodity character of the underlying material used as money whereas the physical appearance of the 
commodity remains untouched. 
 
The second monetary system is characterized by money that comes “into existence as a return for the 
provision of a good or service” that means by a reimbursement of a commodity, or as a bill of exchange 
(Eucken (1950), p. 167). Concerning gold or any other material, the second system is similar to the first 
one due to the individual’s unconstrained possibility to exchange the notes or sight deposits into the 
underlying commodity. The major difference is of an institutional character, thus by the existence of a 
financial intermediary that converts gold into notes and deposits. Therefore this system is alike to the gold 
currency. 
 
As far as the emitted notes or deposits are based on confidence rather than on a realized service or 
underlying asset or commodity, “provisions” in the sense of bills of exchange are closely related to the 
third monetary system. In this third type, money is created by credit extension of the central bank or 
commercial banks, respectively, bearing no substantial “internal” value (Eucken (1950), p. 169). A long-
term  money  supply  extension  is  likely  to  occur  in  this  monetary  system  because  it  is  based  on  the 
behaviour  of  the  lender  who  reacts  to  the  overall  demand  for  money  (Eucken  (1952/04),  p.  258). 
Although appreciating the liquidity-enhancing aspect of such a system, especially during the phases of the 
European  industrialization,  Eucken  rejects  the  third  system  because  of  the  risks  of  cumulative 
contractions and extensions resulting in monetary crises like the Depression or the German hyperinflation 
(Eucken (1949), p. 77). 
 
Underlining these negative impacts, Eucken emphasizes in this respect the role of the central bank after 
the collapse of the Gold Standard. Due to the abolition of the disciplining gold mechanism, governments 
were motivated to act “arbitrarily” with the central bank money supply, as Eucken (1925) has criticized 
already earlier, evoking an unrestricted expansion of paper currency supply and thereby accelerating the 
inflationary processes of the third monetary system over again (Eucken (1925), p. 2). Furthermore, it is 
crucial for him that the loss of the automatically triggered conduction of monetary policy within the third 
monetary system allows the central bank unrestricted discretionary powers. 
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To sum up, Eucken’s major objective is to roll back the money supply by commercial banks concerning 
credit extension or contraction, respectively as well as to discipline central bank money creation to prevent 
a fiduciary issue of notes misuse of central bank money. This objective is also shared by Simons - that was 
published earlier (Simons (1936/48)) and which is quoted by Eucken (Eucken (1949)). The explanation 
for their conjoint aim towards the reform of monetary institutions is different: Eucken’s view is borne out 
his systematic analysis of the three monetary systems and the disclosed antagonism to the modern credit 
based economy, whereas Simons’ explanation is much more problem-oriented and formulated in response 
to the Great Depression in the United States. The direction both proposals point at is of a high degree of 
consistency. Therefore we find that Simons and Eucken are “brothers in mind” – also on the field of 
monetary reform. 
 
A closer look in Eucken’s proposal for monetary reform reveals the impact of Simons’ and Hayek’s 
contributions. 
 
Eucken’s  individual  proposal  is  based  on  the  commodity  reserve  currency  elaborated  by  Benjamin 
Graham in 1937 (Eucken (1952/04), p. 264) and represented by Hayek in 1943 (Hayek (1943)). Hayek 
favoured this monetary order until he came up with the denationalization of money in the beginning of 
the 1970s, due to the reason that the currency was based on commodity reserves. Graham’s concept is 
based on the implementation of agencies trading certificates akin options of commodity bundles that 
include consumer goods and raw materials. The price of each standardized bundle is determined by the 
weighted unit prices of the underlying products and materials. An increasing price level evokes the sale of 
certificates by the agency resulting in an expansion of the supply of consumer goods and raw materials in 
an economy and simultaneously to a contraction of the money supply. In the case of decreasing prices, 
certificates are bought, the commodity supply decreases and money is released by the agencies. Eucken 
appreciates Graham’s conception due to the analogue mechanism the commodity reserve currency has in 
common with the gold currency emphasizing the advantage that the value of the emerging money is 
linked  “to  the  value  of  many  commodities” rather  than  on  the  “value  of  one  commodity”  (Eucken 
(1952/04), p. 262). Apart from that, the commodity reserve currency fulfils Eucken’s ideal conception of 
an automatic adjustment of the money supply that depends on the movement of prices (Eucken (1925), p. 
12) rather than on particular discretionary or “political decisions” (Eucken (1949), p. 98). For the latter 
Eucken integrates a central bank to Graham’s concept that has the solely right to emit bank notes and 
coins but restricting any discretionary operations by setting up a functional link between the agencies and 
the central bank (Eucken (1952/04), p. 263): In order to achieve this requirement, Eucken seeks to tie the 
central bank to the automatic working mechanism of the agencies’ operations resulting in an overall 
adjustment of the central bank monetary supply in accordance to the movements of commodity prices. 
Enforcing this objective for commercial banks too, to prevent a demand driven credit expansion in the 
case of increasing commodity prices, Eucken makes the arrangement in his proposal to limit their ability 
to create deposit money by a 100 percent minimum reserve ratio. Implementing this precaution stemming  
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from the Chicago Plan, Eucken directly refers to Simons’ “leading role” in the Chicago School by the time 
as well as his contribution to the 100 per cent plan (Eucken (1949) Fn. on pp. 79, 98). Furthermore, 
Eucken’s first post-doctoral student, Friedrich Lutz, introduces the Chicago Plan in the second volume of 
the Freiburg School’s journal “Ordnung der Wirtschaft” with a surprisingly positive assessment (Lutz 
(1936/62)). There is no doubt that Eucken appraised this contribution since it also reflects the habilitation 
thesis  of  Friedrich  Lutz,  which  was  accepted  by  Eucken  and  his  colleague  Franz  Böhm  and  Hans 
Großmann-Doerth  in  1936.  The  introduction  to  this  volume  also  encompasses  the  founding 
memorandum  of  the  Freiburg  School  which  underpins  our  assumption  that  Simons’  ideas  were 
recognized and appraised already in 1936 in Freiburg. As a matter of fact, Friedrich Lutz later visited the 
University of Chicago as a visiting Rockefeller Foundation Student in 1937 which might explain how the 
Chicagoan ideas were indirectly brought to Freiburg. 
 
It is also remarkable that Eucken embraced the 100 per cent proposal until his sudden death in 1950 since 
the posthumously edited volume “Principles of Economic Policy” still carries forward Simons’ monetary 
proposal – with the above mentioned additional features, of course. Therefore, we argue that the Freiburg 
School and the “Old Chicago” School had exactly the same objective in mind, which is to assure that the 
central bank has the power to control the supply of commercial bank money. The Freiburgian deviation 
from “Old Chicago”, though, is that the Central Bank should be tied to the mechanism of the commodity 
reserve currency which was adopted from Hayek (1943). Thereby Eucken achieves the subordinate aim of 
rolling back  the supply  of money  -  based  on  the third  monetary system  -  besides  the  realization of 
implementing a value of money stabilizing mechanism disclaiming any discretionary operations for the 
central bank. It therefore appears that Eucken was much more aware of granting a second-best rule for 
the central bank as Simons called for. This could be best achieved by combining the 100 per cent idea 
with Hayek’s proposal. 
 
3.2  Mont Pèlerin Society’s 1947 meeting as the “melting pot” of ideas 
On  June  19  1946  Henry  Simons,  aged  barely  47,  dies  suddenly.  This  is  a  true  setback  for  Hayek’s 
endeavours during his visit to the USA in 1946. In November he writes to Eucken: 
“It will by the way be of interest to you that the main goal of my America trip was an attempt to 
arrange in Chicago a larger study about the question as to what changes are necessary in the “legal 
framework”  [English  quote  in  the  German  text,  EK/SK]  in  order  to  make  the  competitive 
economy  effective.  Unfortunately  the  man  on  whom  my  plans  were  mostly  centered,  Henry 
Simons, died suddenly and I do not know yet if the project can be continued despite that. The 
idea was a positive complement to my book [“The Road to Serfdom”, EK/SK] …” (Hayek 
(1946), p. 2) 11 
 
                                                       
11 We wish to thank the estate of F. A. Hayek for granting us the permission to quote from his correspondence.  
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Thus Henry Simons cannot attend the founding meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society in April 1947, 
instead his disciple12 Aaron Director is invited to give an address to the session “”Free Enterprise” and 
Competitive Order” which takes place on April 1. Simons is especially mentioned in Hayek’s address as a 
person who should have attended “this conference” and who has contributed important work on the 
topic  “with  rare  courage  and  lucidity”  (Hayek  (1947/48),  p.  117).13  In  the  following,  the  papers  by 
Director, Eucken and Hayek will be analysed and compared as they can be seen as the condensed versions 
of these three “theories of order” (Chicago, Freiburg and Hayek) and their parallel development in the 
1930s and the early 1940s. 
 
All three papers underscore that they are aimed at a long-term program and not so much at the immediate 
problems after the war. Director, Eucken and Hayek talk about their vision that it is the long-term impact 
of ideas which interests them when formulating the theory of the competitive order. See three quotations: 
“We are perhaps witnessing a fundamental change in our basic beliefs. The virtues of individual 
freedom no longer command the support they once did.” (Director (1947), pp. 1-2) 
as well as: 
“The factual development moves against us, whereas in the realm of ideas one can make out a 
new flexibility in our sense.” (Eucken (1947), p. 2) 
as well as: 
“It is from this long-run point of view that we must look at our task. It is the beliefs which must 
spread, if a free society is to be preserved, or restored, not what is practical at the moment, which 
must be our concern.” (Hayek (1947/48), p. 108) 
 
The long-term program of the competitive order is at the center of the three papers. This can be seen as a 
program developed in a parallel manner (due to the far-reaching isolation of Germany between 1933 and 
1945,  probably  independently  from  each  other)  in  Chicago,  Freiburg  and  London.  What  is  it  about, 
according to the three papers? 
 
The first unanimous aim of the papers is to show that the implementation of a competitive order is by no 
means equal to a laissez-faire type of policy. Instead, it is about a positive type of policy with the goal of 
establishing “rules of the game”. Eucken concludes his paper with the passage that government should be 
concerned  about  the  order  (i.e.  the  rules)  and  not  about  the  process  (i.e.  the  moves  of  the  private 
individuals) which is to be left free (Eucken (1947), p. 4). Director stresses that the mistake of theoretical 
liberalism was to believe that government, by doing nothing, establishes competitive markets; the latter 
has to be achieved, in his opinion, by an extension of this liberal theory which explicitly aims at the 
competitive character (Director (1947), pp. 3-4). Hayek also warns from meaningless and ambiguous 
                                                       
12 Let us again quote Director on his relationship to Simons: “I never took a course from him, but I was greatly 
influenced by him”, see Kitch (1983), p. 179. 
13 The pagination for Hayek’s address is taken from the reprint in “Individualism and Economic Order” since this is 
widely available. In Director’s and Eucken’s addresses, the pagination is taken as in the archival documents.  
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terms like “free enterprise”, “freedom of contract” or “private property” and underscores that it is the 
competitive order which is to be aimed at by economic policy and not the above terms which at first lack 
a precise content (Hayek (1947/48), pp. 111-113). 
 
And yes, the framework of the competitive order is again closely related to the issue of power. Even 
though not central to Hayek, he does not miss to discuss the issue of governmental power as connected to 
the private power of organized groups (Hayek (1947/48), pp. 116-117). But to Director and Eucken, the 
power problem is truly fundamental. They both speak of monopoly power on the side of the enterprises 
(Director  (1947), pp.  5-6  and  Eucken  (1947),  pp.  2-3)  but  in the  same  instance  sharply  criticize  the 
monopoly  power  on  the  side  of  the  trade  unions  (Director  (1947),  p.  7  and  Eucken  (1947),  p.  1). 
Uniformly, they see the only possible solution of the power problem in the competitive order, due to (as 
described in section 3.1) competition’s seminal property of disempowering. 
 
The positive program related to the competitive order is not only about competition in the narrow sense. 
It is about a complex, above all interdependent set of policies which are to be applied jointly for the 
competitive order to come into being and to persist. It is about competition on the commodity and labor 
market, but also about monetary stability (Director speaks explicitly of a “monetary framework”, Director 
(1947), p. 8), Eucken touches upon the importance of monetary issues for the rest of the economic order, 
Eucken (1947), p. 3). In addition, Director and Hayek speak about the question of equality and security 
and to what extent it has to be answered in the competitive order (Director (1947), pp. 9-11, Hayek 
(1947/48), p. 112). 
 
Immensely important is, apart from the interdependency aspect of these different intricate fields of policy, 
that the measures themselves are to be thought not as “ad-hoc interventions” (Director (1947), p. 9) but 
as “encompassing economic policy” [“Gesamtwirtschaftspolitik” in the original, EK/SK] (Eucken (1947), 
p. 3). Thus, one can say that the establishment of the competitive order is tied to several prerequisites 
which are to be found on various fields of economic policy (treatment of monopoly (general problem, 
treatment of cartels, of natural monopolies), trade unions, monetary policy, patent regulation, contract law 
etc.) and has to be conceived as a coherent program. The lack of such a consistent general program or 
philosophy is, in Hayek’s words, one of the main reasons for the decline of liberalism and the usurpation 
of the state by special interests (Hayek (1947/48), p. 107). 
 
Thus, in the immediate post-war period the group of new liberals at the Mont Pèlerin, to which the 
Chicago, Freiburg and Hayekian strands of thought intimately belong, is already quite advanced in their 
joint effort to replace the (in their eyes) useless dogma of laissez-faire with an operational goal for liberal 
economic policy, the competitive order. The meeting in 1947 was probably the climax of this research 
program. Few years later, Eucken dies. Director, after editing the “Economic Policy for a Free Society” 
volume of Simons in 1947-48, successively leaves the agenda of “Old Chicago” and joins forces with the  
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new paradigm prevalent both at the Law School and at the Economics Department, related to Friedman 
and Stigler (Van Horn (2009), pp. 213-228). Hayek, after losing Simons and Eucken, also abandons the 
competitive order as a goal of a free society and gradually has his evolutionist turn (Kolev (2010), pp. 13-
17). 
 
Only  decades  later,  Constitutional  Political  Economy  re-discovered  the  importance  of  the  economic 
constitution and, together with the few remaining representatives of the Freiburg School, develops a new 
research program which can well be traced back to “Old Chicago” and Freiburg of the 1930s and 1940s. 
The relationship between Simons whom James Buchanan calls “the most articulate expositor of the “old” 
Chicago School” (Buchanan (2010), p. 3) and Buchanan’s own research program of CPE (he calls himself 
“a  representative  adherent”  of  “old”  Chicago  School,  Buchanan  (2010),  p.  5)  becomes  clear  by  this 
statement and Buchanan’s thoughts on the necessary distinction between Chicago “old” and “new”. 
 
4.  Outlook: Rule-based economic policy, CPE and the post-crisis window of 
opportunity 
The generation of Simons, Eucken and Hayek used the term “neo-liberalism” in the 1930s and 1940s as a 
description  of  a  new research  program  which  evolved  in  that  period.  Chicago, London,  Vienna  and 
Freiburg  are  considered  the  four  central  locations  of  this  generation’s  efforts  to  re-define  classical 
liberalism and transpose its central messages into the 20th century. To what extent this venues were 
intellectually  connected  to  each  other,  is  difficult  to  say  since  especially  the  Chicago-Freiburg  nexus 
requires knowledge of archives which are not accessible, especially the one of Walter Eucken. Thus in this 
paper we attempted to juxtapose the “Old Chicago” and the Freiburg program of the 1930s and 1940s to 
assess the degree of proximity of these strands of thought. It is fascinating to see the parallelity which 
Simons’ and Eucken’s oeuvres exhibit in these two decades. The picture becomes even more intriguing as 
Hayek is included in this mosaic, by posing the hypothesis that he might be the link between Chicago and 
Freiburg of that period. And indeed, Simons’, Eucken’s and Hayek’s quests for the renewed liberalism in 
the  1930s  and  1940s  bear,  in  large  areas,  striking  similaries.  Above  all,  the  topos  question  of  “Old 
Chicago” and Freiburg is the issue of disempowerment, and all three protagonists see the solution to this 
question in the competitive order. The competitive order is for all of them an interdependent set of 
economic policy which are positive (i.e. aim at shaping new legal institutions and not only removing 
existing obstacles) and rule-based (i.e. where discretion and arbitrariness are reduced to a minimum and 
liberty within the rules is maximized). Of course, in concrete economic policy (here competition and 
monetary policy were reviewed) the practical proposals are not identical, but the very basic principles on 
which the three “positive programs” are based are strikingly similar.  
 
Due to the early deaths of Simons and Eucken, this research program which culminates in the 1947 
founding meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society only lives on in the oeuvre of Hayek, and there it undergoes  
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significant variations in the course of the next decades’ intellectual evolution. But ideas seldom die out 
completely, and thus it seems to us that James Buchanan’s Constitutional Political Economy research 
program is a true successor to the Simons-Eucken-Hayek triangle. We will show in a next version of this 
project that we join Viktor Vanberg’s interpretation that CPE can be seen as a re-interpretation of the 
neo-liberals’ efforts of the 1930s and 1940s and thus unites “Old Chicago”, declared by Buchanan himself, 
with concepts of the Freiburg School and the Hayekian heritage. As we hope to show with this paper, 
these three strands of thought are compatible with and complementary to each other. 
 
In  our  understanding,  such  analyses  in  History  of  Economic  Thought  are  of  course  fascinating  in 
themselves, but should also possess some practicability for today’s economic policy discourse. In the 
world of 2011, after the decades of boom and the years of a severe bust in the Western world, the interest 
for the fundamental questions of economic theory and its policy implications has increased markedly. 
History of Economic Thought, by discovering research programs from the past, can contribute to today’s 
debates by preventing the necessity of “rediscovering the wheel” in every generation of new economists. 
We see the world of 2011, with its severe problems especially in the monetary field but also in other fields 
of the economic order, the necessity to rediscover the debate about rules and liberty in economics. The 
boom-bust cycle of the last decades clearly indicates that non-rule-based policies in the complex reality we 
live in are doomed to failure and unintended consequences which nobody can forecast in advance. Thus 
rules, as seen by the Simons-Eucken-Hayek generation but also by later CPE scholars like Buchanan and 
Vanberg, should in our opinion become the focal point in the economic policy debate of today. This has 
severe implications both for economics as a science and for the politicians which would be the addressee 
of the rules. If we want to reap the fruits of globalization for a long period to come, we urgently need a 
monetary framework which simultaneously ensures prosperity and stability. For our “Great Recession” 
not to become a new “Great Depression”, the neo-liberal ideas from the last big crisis of capitalism seem 
a good point to start.  
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